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Abstract—Packet-based or Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) 
intrusion detection systems (IDSs) face challenges when coping 
with high volume of traffic. Processing every payload on the wire 
degrades the performance of intrusion detection. This paper 
aims to develop a model for reducing the amount of data to be 
processed by intrusion detection using flow-based approach. We 
investigated the detection accuracy of this approach via 
implementation of this model using Bro IDS. Bro was used to 
generate malicious features from several recent labeled datasets. 
Then, the model made use the machine learning classification 
algorithms for attribute evaluation and Bro policy scripts for 
detecting malicious flows. Based on our experiments, the 
findings showed that flow-based detection was able to identify 
the presence of all malicious activities. This verifies the 
capability of this approach to detect malicious flows with high 
accuracy. However, this approach generated a significant 
number of false positive alarms. This indicates that for detection 
purpose, it is difficult to make a complete behavior of the 
malicious activities from only limited data and flow-level. 
 
Index Terms—Flow-Based Detection; Bro Intrusion Detection 
System; Machine Learning; Public Datasets. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The rapid increase of computers, users, and services 
connected to the Internet has resulted in the growth of Internet 
traffic volume and bandwidth in wide area networks (WAN). 
Continuous growth of network traffic presents serious threats 
against the security protection devices such as network 
intrusion detection systems (IDSs) [1]. With the increase in 
network volume and speed, existing network IDSs, which 
analyses per packet based, face challenges when capturing 
full payload traffic for malicious inspection, which in turn 
affects the performance and accuracy of IDS. 
This issue motivates us to introduce flow-based IDS 
approach, which reduces the amount of data to be analyzed 
by looking at aggregated information of related packets in the 
form of flow. In this paper, we studied how the flow-based 
IDS approach can detect certain malicious activities, using 
open source: Bro IDS [2]. We used Bro as it provides 
comprehensive data analysis and it is able to deal with large 
datasets. Bro traffic analysis was applied on several labeled 
datasets to generate malicious features. From these malicious 
features, we used machine learning algorithms to generate the 
most important attributes and rules that will be useful for 
implementing flow detection method.  
For validating detection methods, we used different recent 
labeled datasets. This paper emphasizes how the false 
positive rate impacts on the flow-based detection compared 
with the packet-based detection. However, the goal of this 
paper is not to develop an algorithm for detection intrusions, 
but to focus on studying the accuracy of the flow-based 
detection. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section II presents an 
overview of packet-based and flow-based IDS. Section III 
presents the design of Bro flow-based detection method. In 
this section, more details on how detection algorithm is 
developed will be described. Then, in Section IV, we explain 
how to evaluate this method on the testbed with the real traffic 
datasets used in this paper. Finally, while the result and 
discussion are presented on section V, Section VI presents the 
conclusion and the future works. 
 
II. OVERVIEW ON PACKET-BASED AND FLOW-BASED 
 
A. Packet-based IDS 
In packet-based, also named Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), 
a detecting engine has to scan and analyze per packet header 
and payload to determine whether the packet is an intrusion 
or not. This approach is mostly used by signature-based IDS, 
which compares what it analyzed to the given list of 
signatures in the database. With an increasing data volume in 
the traffic, the challenges of packet-based NIDS increase. 
This is because vast amount of data requires vast amount of 
computational performance, particularly complex algorithms.  
Moreover, a drop of packets, resources consumption, and 
missing potential intrusions will occur if the NIDS is not able 
to let the analysis process to be done [3]. As it is very time 
consuming, it is hard or even impossible to perform packet-
based approach in this environment [1]. Generally, the 
advantage of using packet-based IDS in an ideal environment 
is that all common types of known attacks can be detected 
since packets contain all complete data up to the application 
layer (layer 7 in OSI). 
 
B. Flow-based IDS 
With the issues of packet-based NIDS, researchers had to 
find alternative approach that receives little amount of data, 
while not compromising the accuracy. The candidate 
alternative that attracts the attention of researchers is flow-
based NIDS technique. A flow-based IDS does not look at the 
payload content for inspection and analysis; however, it relies 
on information and statistics of network flows. Such 
information includes number of packets and bytes transferred 
over a particular time and start and end time of a flow. 
A flow can be defined as a unidirectional data stream 
between two computer systems, where all transmitted packets 
of this stream share the following 5-tubles: IP source and 
destination address, source and destination port number and 
protocol type [4]. Nowadays, routers are equipped with the 
ability to be configured to generate flow statistics records in 
the form of Netflow [4]. 
Flow-based NIDS consists of the following components: 
an exporter (flow aggregator), a collector, and an analyzer. 
Flow aggregator creates flow records by the accounting 
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traffic statistics from aggregating relevant packets that share 
certain flow keys. The collector’s task is to retrieve the flows, 
and then store and organize them in suitable format for NIDS 
for further analysis. The analyzer (detection engine) or NIDS 
then accesses the collector to analyze and process the flows 
for suspicious detection. It then sends the decision to the 
reporter, and commands are sent to other device, such as 
firewall to filter or block the malicious traffic. 
NIDS in flow-based analyzes small amount of data (flow 
records). Thus, computational process appeared in packet-
based is not a primary concern. For example, based on our 
experiments, the flow-based detection CPU consumption was 
decreased by 30% compared to packet-based detection in 
identical environment. However, it seems that the overhead 
and computational resources consumption in the detection 
analysis disappeared, but on the cost of flow exporting 
process. This is because the exporter, or Netflow device, such 
as router offloads and absorbs the task from NIDS itself. 
Several works attempt to improve the performance of flow 
aggregation process, such as [5] and [6]. 
Since flow records contain aggregated data up to transport 
layer, this issue encourages researchers to enhance flow-
based detection accuracy and reduce the false negatives. 
Researchers have achieved promising results to detect attacks 
(such as DoS, worms, SSH etc.) by focusing on this approach 
only [7] [8] [9]. The author of [10] presents a detailed 
overview of these attacks. This paper differs from the other 
works in that we utilized the existing recent labeled dataset 
for deriving Bro detection scripts. In addition, we employed 
Bro for traffic investigation and analysis since it has potential 
to produce efficient performance [11]. For more details on the 
performance of the packet-based and flow-based IDS, refer to 
[12]. 
 
III. DESIGN 
 
In this section, we present the design and implementation 
of the flow-based detection (see Figure 1) using Bro IDS [2] 
to study the detection accuracy impacts on flow-based 
detection. Bro is a Unix-based open-source network intrusion 
detection system that monitors, analyze, and inspects all 
traffic to detect suspicious activity even in high-speed 
network. Researchers prefer using Bro as it provides more 
flexibility in defining policy and scripting rules, and it comes 
with a large set of pre-built functions. Thus, we can put Bro 
in novel ways by extending Bro script and writing own code 
to satisfy our environment. In addition, Bro is an excellent 
choice for feature extraction [13]. 
In Bro, real-time highly structured log files (can be used for 
digital forensic analysis or later research analysis) are broken 
down by protocols, and alerts are written in plain text ASCII 
to take further actions. Basically, we analyze the outbound 
traffic coming from the internal network to detect possible 
intrusive activities performed by local machines. The output 
of this processing is the list of machines IP addresses, which 
performs malicious activities. The monitored and local hosts 
have been configured in Bro. 
As shown in Figure 1(a), all incoming packets are passed 
to packet-based detection. While the Bro in packet-based 
listens directly from network interface, the Bro in flow-based 
listens from the collector to receive the flow records as input 
(see Figure 1b). For the flow detection, we build Bro 
detection scripts using statistical analysis of the traffic within 
a flow. Before we present how we implement these bro script 
detections for both the flow and packet detection, discussion 
on the datasets used in this paper is presented in the next 
subsection. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Illustration of (a) Packet-based and (b) Flow-based detection. 
 
A. Data Collection 
The most challenging validating detection method is the 
lack of standard public datasets [14]. DARPA 1999, which is 
believed to be the most standard public trace was criticized 
due to its age and inability to reflect real-world traffic by [15]. 
This urges us to find a variety of newer datasets to assess and 
verify the accuracy of our detection algorithms. Only small 
numbers of datasets are publicly available. Although we did 
not receive responses from many public datasets creators, we 
managed to get datasets presented in Table 1, which are made 
public for research community and will be used in this paper. 
The information Security and Object Technology (ISOT) 
dataset, generated by University of Victoria on 2011 has a 
combination of malicious and normal datasets [16]. The other 
datasets are generated from Czech Technical University 
(CTU) in different scenarios and published in 2013. We 
selected four individual scenarios: CTU-50 [17], CTU-51 
[18], CTU-52 [19], and CTU-53 [20] from CTU datasets. 
Explanations of ISOT datasets and CTU scenarios by their 
authors are found on [21] and [22] respectively.  
These datasets consist of real traffic in PCAP format. 
However, these datasets are labeled, i.e. IP addresses of 
malicious and non-malicious hosts are known. Labeling this 
traffic helps us to validate the accuracy of the detection 
methods [23]. These datasets have been used in several 
researches [21], [24]. Table 2 shows the statistical details of 
each dataset.  
However, these existing recent public datasets are limited 
to certain type of attacks. Based on the literature [11], flow-
based detection gives promising results when detecting 
botnets activities that perform repetitive traffic patterns (e.g. 
when a bot infected machines connects frequently to 
Command & Control (C&C) server to receive commands, 
when bot spammer sends many emails to SMTP servers, or 
when “keep-alive” sent from time to time for IRC botnet).  
With these points in mind, and rather than reviewing this 
work on general botnet detection, we selected the following 
bot-related malicious types to be considered in this work: 
Spam bots, IRC bots, and P2P bots. For more details on the 
characteristics of these malicious activities, refer to [25]. 
Spam activities are found in ISOT and CTU-50 datasets. For 
IRC-bot, it was performed on CTU-51 and CTU-52 datasets. 
Traffic
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Packets
Logs
Traffic
Flow Aggregation
Bro Flow-based 
Detection Script
Packets
Flow records
Logs
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Finally, P2P bot activities are generated on both ISOT and 
CTU-53 datasets. 
For the non-malicious traffic, unfortunately, all the 
previous datasets mentioned in Table 1 (except ISOT dataset) 
do not contain full-payload background traffic for privacy 
reasons. For this, we used a one-day complete payload trace 
captured at Alfaisal University, Prince Sultan College Jeddah 
(PSCJ), Information Technology Center, at the main gateway 
link that connects hundreds of hosts with an educational 
network to the Internet. The size of this trace is 2 GB and 
contains eight millions packets, corresponding to 478K flows. 
We named this trace as “PSCJ” and it contains a variety of 
network activities. Similar to non-malicious ISOT, PSCJ 
dataset involves everyday activity usage such as HTTP web 
behavior, popular sharing file packets, IRC traffic, emails, 
and streaming media. However, PSCJ trace is combined and 
injected along with each of the datasets listed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1  
Total number of packets, and flows on datasets 
 
Datasets  Total # Packets Total # Exported Flows 
ISOT 157 millions 5.2 millions 
CTU-50 2.1 millions 159,704 
CTU-51 66.3 millions 31.7 millions 
CTU-52 3.9 millions 1.7 millions 
CTU-53 351,537 11,117 
 
Table 2 
Datasets traffic statistic 
 
Datasets  
Average bytes 
per flow 
Average packets 
per flow 
Average flow 
Duration (sec.) 
ISOT 25,196 44 11.32 
CTU-50 10,438 21 8.94 
CTU-51 2,161 2 0.06 
CTU-52 2,311 2 0.04 
CTU-53 46,063 57 223.27 
 
B. Bro Detection Scripts Derivation 
For developing Bro detection scripts, we utilized the 
existing labeled datasets and we used Bro along with machine 
learning to collect and extract malicious flow and packet 
features from these datasets. Figure 2 illustrates the steps for 
deriving Bro detection scripts for each individual malicious 
type. In this paper, we applied several labeled datasets (as 
shown the Figure 2) to build detection scripts on each 
malicious activity. 
 
a. Bro Analysis 
Bro performs packet and flow analysis against the given 
dataset. Non-malicious and malicious dataset are combined 
and replayed. Malicious dataset selection depends on the type 
of malicious activity type. In this case, CTU-50, CTU-52, and 
CTU-53 datasets are used for spam, IRC-bot, and P2P-bot 
respectively. For non-malicious traffic, PSCJ trace was used. 
For each malicious type, the combined dataset was converted 
into network flows and then, the flows were used as input for 
Bro.  
In addition, non-relevant packets and flows within the 
datasets were eliminated using filtering scripts to limit the 
amount of packet processing of these datasets. These filtering 
scripts are based on known infected and normal machines IP 
addresses, port numbers, and protocols, depending on the 
malicious activities selection. The output of this step is the 
logs (such as weird.log, notice.log, connection.log, smtp.log, 
netflow.log etc.,) generated by both the Bro flow and packet 
analysis. These files contain details regarding unusual 
activities that shed some insights on the behavior of the 
malicious traffic. The features extracted from Bro logs files 
are presented in Table 3. These logs (in CSV format) were 
stored in MySQL database for the next step. 
 
 
Figure 2: Overall Bro detection process. 
 
Table 3 
Features of flow and packet generated from Bro logs 
 
Type Features Description 
Shared 
features 
src_ip IP address of source host 
dest_ip IP address of destination host 
src_p Source port number 
dest_p Destination port number 
Proto Protocol 
Flow-
based 
features 
Octs Total octets or bytes per flow 
Pkts Total packets per flow 
Ts Flow time start (for the first packet in a flow) 
Tf 
Flow time finish (for the last packet in a 
flow) 
Flag TCP Flags 
Packet-
based 
features 
pkt_len Packet length 
pyd_len payload length 
pyd_cnt Payload content 
pkt_time Time stamp 
Derived 
flow 
features 
duration Flow duration (duration = Tf – Ts) 
Bpp Average bytes per packet in flow (Octs/Pkts) 
Bps Average bytes per second (Octs/duration) 
Pps Average packets per second (Pkts/duration) 
tot_flows Total number of flows sent by a host 
Tot_pkts Total number of packets sent by a host 
Tot_octs Total number of bytes sent by a host 
Tot_dur Total number of all flows durations by a host 
b. Observation 
In this step, we observed, parsed and mined the data (based 
on finding from the previous step) in the logs that indicate a 
certain level of abnormality and then identified the malicious 
flow and packet features to be used in the next step. In this 
step, firstly, the association from Bro packet analysis logs to 
Bro flow analysis logs was made. This can be done by 
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matching the 5-tuple and timestamps of both Bro analysis 
logs using MySQL. When a match is found, the flow is 
labelled. 
Since Bro packet logs are generated from full packet 
inspection, it is rich of information. Hence, we assume that 
Bro packet-based logs make the benchmark for the alert 
decision. With this condition in mind and to reduce the 
number of flows for further analysis, the decision to 
determine a malicious flow needs to be made. In this case, a 
decision that a flow is malicious is based on the decision 
derived from the corresponding packet generated by Bro 
packet analysis. In other word, flows that are alerted by Bro 
packet analysis are identified as malicious, hence they are 
extracted and labeled herewith. 
After this association is performed, the flows labeled as 
datasets mixed with malicious and non-malicious labels for 
each malicious type was generated. Secondly, statistical 
analysis on these flow datasets was then taken place as shown 
in Figure 2. For this purpose, we took the advantage of using 
an open-source toolkit, WEKA data mining package that has 
a collection of popular machine learning algorithms. These 
algorithms were used for learning the flow characteristics 
from the datasets (in CSV format) based on the hidden 
features trained by both malicious and non-malicious traffic.  
The main goal for using these algorithms is to classify the  
features and to find out the most important malicious flow 
attributes that provide maximum detection accuracy. Further, 
the corresponding rules (from the classification process) of 
these significant attributes were considered in the next step to 
improve the accuracy of the Bro scripts. Table 4 shows the 
features selected as input of WEKA for the purpose of 
attribute evaluator to generate the most important attributes 
in each malicious type. 
 
Table 4  
Attribute that is used for classification 
 
Attribute Spam-bot IRC-bot P2P-bot 
Flow duration    
Protocol    
Source port    
Destination port    
# Packets per flow    
# bytes per flow    
# Bytes per packet    
# Bytes per second    
 
These feature selections should be relevant to the behavior 
of the malicious type. For example, in the IRC-bot, number 
of packets per flow is much related to the Ping-Pong (keep-
alive) communication used in regular IRC channel. Ignoring 
the unrelated features will avoid noisy attributes that have 
negative effects on the classification accuracy.  
For generating the most significant attributes used in Bro 
scripts,  we used Wrapper subset evaluation that creates all 
possible subsets from our feature vectors, with the best first 
search method. Then, every subset is classified with full 
training set by each classification machine learning 
algorithms (listed in Table 5). Based on the accuracy results 
generated from this algorithm, the most effective features 
were generated. 
 
c. Bro Detection Scripting  
Rules of the most important features derived from the 
previous step, and rules inspired from the literature [26] [27] 
were converted into Bro script syntax. Bro detection script 
mainly has two phases. In the first phase, flows that are not 
matched with the rules mentioned above were discarded 
before entering the next phase. This step helps to reduce the 
amount of flows to be processed. In the second phase, further 
analyses were performed on the flows that match with those 
rules. The main goal of the second phase is to achieve better 
detection rate with low false positive rate.  
 
Table 5  
Attribute selection setting and classification selection 
 
Type Description 
Attribute evaluator Wrapper 
Search method Best first 
Attribute selection mode Full training 
Number of folds 5 
Classification algorithm 
Tree 
J48 (C4.5) 
Random Tree 
RepTree 
BFTree 
Rule 
JRip 
PART 
DTNB 
 
Basically, the second phase was implemented in Bro script 
to record the number of flows of a certain host IP address, 
within a specified time interval. If the number of flows 
exceeds a threshold, the host is considered as malicious. For 
detecting these repetitive pattern malicious activities in flow 
detection, we added scripts that track the malicious IP 
addresses at every certain period of time to make sure that the 
malicious activities occur frequently. For example, a keep-
alive message (Ping-Pong) is exchanged in regular interval 
by the command and control (C&C) server to check whether 
the client host is alive. 
The threshold assigned in Bro is not static. Depending on 
the malicious activity type, thresholds were updated and 
calculated periodically (e.g. scheduled of 50 seconds) based 
on the total number of potential concurrent connections 
associated with a host and the total number of all hosts 
participating within the predefined duration of time. Two 
points were considered in this step. Firstly, to avoid false 
negative alerts, the detection scope should not be narrow, but 
this will be on the account on false positive alert. Secondly, 
since flow aggregator may produce several flow records with 
the same connection (e.g. when downloading big file),  
analysing these records repeatedly in the flow-based 
detection may waste resources. However, we solve this issue 
by discarding the existing flows. 
 
d. Validation 
Once the detection script is implemented, it is important to 
validate it and determine the possible false negatives and 
positive alerts. To do so, we ran the Bro policy script obtained 
from the previous step into the flow-based detection model in 
Figure 1 (b). Here, we input new datasets that carries same 
malicious activities besides the  background traffic. The logs 
were then inspected to see whether the known IP addresses of 
the infected machines (that produce malicious flows) are 
detected or not.  
In this step, we validated spam and P2P-bot detection by 
ISOT dataset while in IRC-bot we used CTU-51 dataset. For 
all malicious types and non-malicious traffic in ISOT dataset, 
we combined these datasets with PSCJ trace as additional 
background dataset. Next section presents the experimental 
testbed where the validation took place. The output of this 
stage is discussed on  Section V. 
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IV. TESTBED EXPERIMENT 
 
We ran Bro flow-based detection on testbed depicted in 
Figure 3. The experimental environment run on two machines 
interconnected through a Gigabit switch. Both machines are 
running 12.04 Linux-based Ubuntu Desktop 64-bit with Intel 
i7 3.1 GHz with 32 GB of RAM. Both machines NICs support 
Gbps. To get more reliable experimental results, detection 
method should receive the PCAP traffic in a way that 
represents the real network environment instead of reading 
the PCAP file in offline way. For this purpose, the first 
machine was used for the traffic generation which replays real 
(previously captured) network traffic datasets on the wire 
using tcpreplay v4.0.5 [28] and sent it to the second machine. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Testbed schematically diagram for proposed mechanism. 
 
The super feature of tcpreplay tool is the different traffic 
speeds that can be adjusted and controlled when injecting to 
the network interface. The replaying trace speed can be either 
in the original captured speed or by multiplying the original 
capture speed by a value (e.g. we reply traffic three times as 
fast as it was originally captured). The switch support Giga 
bit speed with port mirror enabled it to forward all traffic to 
the analyzing machine. 
The second machine was installed with Softflowd v0.9.9 
[29] and Bro 2.3. Softflowd was used as a flow aggregator 
with default parameters to generate flow records from the 
dataset packets received and to be exported to the collector. 
Softflowd is also capable of Cisco netflow export format. In 
addition, to verify that Softflowd receive all packets from 
tcpreplay machine, we used Softflowctl program to track 
Softflowd process for statistical measurements. Bro provides 
command-line interface (CLI) and is used for malicious 
detection using policy script obtained from the previous 
section. In addition, Bro is configured to collect the flow 
records by reading the flows from a UDP socket in the 
localhost in a way to be suitable for Bro analysis. 
 
V. RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
 
To check the correctness of labeling decisions in datasets, 
they were analyzed and verified manually using Bro logs. For 
example, after extracting and analyzing the flows initiated 
from the internal hosts who were labeled as spammers in the 
ISOT dataset, we observed that these machines exhibited 
unusual usage comparing to other machines. These machines 
engaged in large number of SMTP connections (7,699 flows) 
within short time of period, by sending packets (with 
randomly source email addresses and advertising words in the 
email’s subject) to many external servers on port 25. 
However, only one machine (172.16.0.2) in ISOT dataset 
seem to have either incomplete traffic or been wrongly 
labelled as spam. All other labelled machines as infected 
machines on the other datasets were found to be correctly 
labeled. 
 
Table 6 
Best three important attribute 
 
Classification 
algorithm 
Spam-bot IRC-bot P2P-bot 
J48 
dest_p duration 
pkts 
dest_p 
pkts 
octs 
src_p 
dest_p 
duration 
Random Tree 
dest_p 
duration 
pkts 
dest_p 
pkts 
duration 
src_p 
dest_p 
pkts 
Rep Tree 
dest_p duration 
pkts 
dest_p 
pkts 
octs 
src_p 
dest_p 
duration 
BF Tree 
dest_p duration 
pkts 
dest_p 
pkts 
duration 
src_p 
dest_p 
duration 
PART 
dest_p duration 
pkts 
dest_p 
pkts 
duration 
orig_p 
dest_p 
duration 
Jrib 
dest_p duration 
pkts 
dest_p 
octs 
duration 
orig_p 
dest_p 
pkts 
DTNB 
dest_p duration 
pkts 
Pkts 
octs 
pps 
orig_p 
dest_p 
pps 
 
For the most significant attributes used in Bro scripts, Table 
6 lists the best three important attributes generated by 
different classification algorithms (that listed in Table 5) for 
each malicious type. We found that these attributes were very 
useful in our Bro detection script. For example, for Spam 
detection, it was obvious that destination port is among these 
attributes as port 25 on the SMPT destination server is a good 
sign of this malicious type. It was also observed that packets 
and bytes per flow in IRC-bot were the most significant 
attributes since their values are constant (when e.g. for each 
time keep-alive is exchanged). 
For Bro script validation, the notions presented in Table 7 
were used in this section to measure the common metrics: true 
positive and true negative rate and precision. When using new 
labelled datasets in our experiment, Bro flow-based detection 
scripts marked all known infected machines IP addresses in 
these datasets as malicious (FN = zero). This mean that Bro 
script is able to detect all the infected machines that generate 
malicious flows with 100% detection accuracy or True 
Positive Rate (TPR) as calculated in: 
 
𝑇𝑃𝑅 =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁
=
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒
 
(1) 
 
For false positive rate and precision, we used the following 
formulas: 
 
𝐹𝑃𝑅 =
𝐹𝑃
𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁
=
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑦 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒
 
(2) 
 
Gigabit Switch
Traffic Generator
Gbps NIC
(tcpreplay Linux tool)
Port Mirror
Background 
and 
Datasets
Pcap Files
PCAP
trace
SoftflowdCollectorBro IDS Flows
Flow
records
Packets
This is in case flow-based is required
Packets
LAN
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𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃
=
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 
 
(3) 
 
Table 8 shows the FPR and precision for each malicious 
type. It shows that flow-based detection suffers from false 
positive alerts generation. This is because of the similarity 
between malicious and non-malicious recorded data. Such 
data include flow duration, port number, and number of 
packets per flow. In addition, unlike packet-based detection, 
incomplete data (no payload data) of the flow-based analysis 
also play important role for producing these false alarms. In 
other words, payloads provide significant role for identifying 
non-malicious traffic. To test the false positive in packet-
based, we ran IRC-bot dataset and no false positive alerts was 
generated which indicates that the accuracy level when 
payload is inspected. 
 
Table 7   
Metric Notions 
 
 Actual Non-Malicious Actual Malicious 
Detected as 
malicious 
False Positive (FP) True Positive (TP) 
Detected as non-
malicious 
True Negative (TN) False Negative (FN) 
 
Table 8  
False positive rate (FPR) and precision 
 
Type  Spam-bot IRC-bot P2P-bot 
FPR# 0.05 0.25 0.20 
Precision$  0.66 0.66 0.42 
 
#the value is 0, if there is no FP $value is 1, if there is no FP 
  
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, we showed how Bro is powerful and useful 
tool for data analysis and feature extraction on the recent 
labelled dataset. We ran Bro flow-based detection against 
several labelled datasets to detect malicious activities. Based 
on our experiments, no false negatives was reported. This 
indicates that Bro detection implementation along with 
attributes selection obtained from machine learning promise 
high detection rate for flow-based detection.  
However, false positive alerts were generated from Bro 
detection which degrades the accuracy of flow-based 
detection. It is also concluded that since only flow data is 
available in flow-based detection, it is hard to make complete 
potential behaviour about the malicious activities found in the 
datasets. Since packet-based detection does not report any 
false positive alerts, it deserves higher score in accuracy and 
gives us a hint in putting this packet Bro detection as the 
second layer in  the flow-based detection for future work. 
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